Difference between revisions of "False Claims Act"

1,214 bytes added ,  05:00, 3 November 2021
Line 85: Line 85:


The second prong (“other efforts to stop FCA violation”) is subject to an “objective reasonableness” standard, which requires only that an employee’s actions be “motivated by an objectively reasonable belief that the employer is violating, or soon will violate, the FCA.” ''United States ex rel. Grant v. United Airlines Inc.'', 912 F.3d 190, 200 (4th Cir. 2018).
The second prong (“other efforts to stop FCA violation”) is subject to an “objective reasonableness” standard, which requires only that an employee’s actions be “motivated by an objectively reasonable belief that the employer is violating, or soon will violate, the FCA.” ''United States ex rel. Grant v. United Airlines Inc.'', 912 F.3d 190, 200 (4th Cir. 2018).
=='''FCA Whistleblower Protection Not Limited to Disclosures About the Whistleblower’s Employer'''==
As the Fourth Circuit held in O’Hara v. Nika Technologies, Inc., 2017— F.3d —-2017 WL 6542675 (4th Cir. Dec. 22, 2017), an FCA retaliation plaintiff need not demonstrate their protected disclosure concerns fraud committed by their employer:
The plain language of § 3730(h) reveals that the statute does not condition protection on the employment relationship between a whistleblower and the subject of his disclosures. Section 3730(h) protects a whistleblower from retaliation for “lawful acts done … in furtherance of an action under this section.” 31U.S.C. § 3730(h)(1). The phrase “an action under this section” refers to a lawsuit under §3730(b), which in turn states that “[a] person may bring a civil action for a violation of [the FCA].” ''Id.'' § 3730(b)(1). Therefore, § 3730(h) protects lawful acts in furtherance of an FCA action. This language indicates that protection under the statute depends on the type of conduct that the whistleblower discloses— ''i.e.'', a violation of the FCA—rather than the whistleblower’s relationship to the subject of his disclosures.